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1 Introduction
Fish schools, wolf packs, bird flocks, and insect colonies exemplify the inherent tendency
of animals to aggregate and live in groups (Krause and Ruxton, 2002; Sumpter, 2010).
Within these groups, animals engage in a vast array of collective actions such as foraging
(Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000), hunting (Packer and Ruttan, 1988), vigilance (Ward
et al., 2011), defense (Hartbauer, 2010), and navigation (Simons, 2004). These social
interactions are not without conflict, as individual and collective interests can oppose
each other to the point of discouraging joint action and the pursuit of common goals.
Here we follow the game-theoretic approach of modelling such social dilemmas in-
volved in collective action as multiplayer matrix games in which payoffs for individuals
are determined by their own action, namely whether to cooperate or not, and the num-
ber of other individuals within their group who choose to cooperate (Broom et al., 1997;
Pen˜a et al., 2014). As shown in the vast literature on nonlinear public goods games
(e.g., Dugatkin, 1990; Motro, 1991; Bach et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Cuesta et al.,
2008; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011) cooperative behavior may
arise in the evolutionary solution of such games even when other mechanisms poten-
tially promoting cooperation such as relatedness (Eshel and Motro, 1988; Archetti,
2009; Pen˜a et al., 2015) and reciprocity in repeated interactions (Boyd and Richerson,
1988; Hilbe et al., 2014) are absent.
Evolutionary models of collective action, including the ones cited above, typically
assume that social interactions occur in groups of identical size. In contrast, empirical
studies of animal group sizes show large variation in group size (Bonabeau et al., 1999;
Gerard et al., 2002; Jovani and Tella, 2007; Griesser et al., 2011; Hayakawa and Fu-
ruhashi, 2012). This paper studies how this intrinsic variability in group size affects the
evolution of cooperative behavior. We do so by modeling the evolutionary dynamics
with the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)
and under the assumptions that the group-size distribution is exogenous, the popula-
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tion is well-mixed, and individuals express one of the two possible pure strategies. This
is the same setting as the one used in Pen˜a (2012) to investigate the effects of group-size
diversity in public goods, that is, without any frequency-dependent or assortment bias
in group composition. Although real group formation processes will certainly lead to
such biases, we stick to this setting as it allows us to infer the consequences of relax-
ing the assumption of fixed group sizes without introducing the confounding effect of
strategy assortment.
We identify general conditions, both on the class of group-size distributions and
on the payoff structure of the collective action problem, which allow us to conclude
whether more or less variation in group size promotes or inhibits cooperation. We thus
go beyond Pen˜a (2012) in not limiting us to the comparison of a deterministic group
size with a variable group size (resp. the comparison of three particular group-size
distributions) and by going beyond particular examples for collective action problems
such as the volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann, 1985) and public goods game with synergy
or discounting (Hauert et al., 2006).
To obtain our results, we combine three different kinds of insights. First, we build
on results obtained in Motro (1991) and Pen˜a et al. (2014) to identify conditions on the
payoff structure of the game which are sufficient to infer those shape properties of the
gain function that are required to identify the variability effects we are interested in
(Lemmas 1 and 2). These results dispense with the need to explicitly calculate the gain
function (i.e., the difference in expected payoff between the two strategies) whenever
the payoff structure of the game satisfies the relevant conditions.
Second, we use the theory of stochastic orders (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007)
to give precise meaning to the notion that one distribution is more ore less variable
than another. This allows us to extend the comparison between a deterministic group
size and a variable group size considered in Pen˜a (2012) to the comparison of different
group-size distributions. In particular, the very same condition on the shape of the gain
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function (when viewed as a function of group size) which Pen˜a (2012) identified as being
sufficient for group-size variability to promote cooperation relative to the benchmark of
a deterministic group size yields the same conclusion for any two group-size distributions
that can be compared in the convex order (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007). Many
commonly considered group-size distributions with the same expected value can be
compared in this way and often this is easy to check graphically.
Third, we demonstrate that focusing on the variability of the group-size distribution
per se confounds two effects that are better understood when viewed separately. The
issue is that the proportion of groups with a given size s is not identical to the proportion
of individuals in groups with size s because a randomly chosen individual is more likely
to find itself in a large rather than a small group. Whereas the former proportions are
described by the group-size distribution, the latter are described by the so-called size-
biased sampling distribution (Patil and Rao, 1978) that, for convenience, we refer to as
the experienced group-size distribution. The empirical importance of distinguishing the
group-size distribution and the experienced group-size distribution is well-understood
in the statistical literature; a recent discussion in a biological context can be found
in Jovani and Mavor (2011). The theoretical importance of distinguishing between
the two distributions in our setting arises because an increase in the variability of
the experienced group-size distribution may have different evolutionary consequences
than an increase in the variability of the group-size distribution. This is because more
variability in group size does not simply induces more variability in experienced group
size but also increases average experienced group size.
Our main results are summarized in Propositions 1 and 2. These propositions are
stated in terms of the gain sequence of the game, which collects the gains from switching
(Pen˜a et al., 2014), i.e., the difference in payoff a focal player obtains from switching its
strategy as a function of the number of other cooperating players in the focal player’s
group. Proposition 1 shows that more variation in experienced group size promotes the
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evolution of cooperative behavior whenever the payoff structure of the game is such that
the gain sequence is convex, whereas with concave gains from switching more variation
in experienced group size inhibits the evolution of cooperative behavior. 1 Because
more variation in group size not only implies more variation in experienced group size
but also an upward shift in the experienced group-size distribution, these conditions do
not suffice to imply that more variation in group size (rather than in experienced group-
size) promotes or inhibits cooperative behavior. Proposition 2 takes this confounding
effect into account and shows that more variation in group size promotes cooperative
behavior whenever the gain sequence is convex and increasing, whereas cooperative
behavior is inhibited when the gain sequence is concave and decreasing.
The difference between the sufficient conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 is significant
as there are interesting collective action problems for which the gains from switching are
convex or concave but fail the additional monotonicity properties required to determine
whether more variation in group size promotes or inhibits cooperation. We illustrate
this and other features of our analysis by using the volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann,
1985) and the public goods game with synergy or discounting (Hauert et al., 2006,
Section 2.3.2) as examples. Further examples will be provided in Section 4, where we
also discuss classes of collective action problems for which our approach is not applicable
because the gain sequences are neither convex nor concave. Finally, we investigate the
consequences of our main results for the number and location of stable rest points of
the replicator dynamics, demonstrating that an increase or decrease in experienced
group-size variability can induce transcritical and saddle-node bifurcations by which
rest points can be created, destroyed, and their stability changed.
1Here and throughout our formal analysis we focus on the effects of an increase in (experienced)
variability as the corresponding results for the effects of a decrease in (experienced) variability are easily
inferred as they are simply opposite in sign. For instance, Proposition 1 can be read as the statement
that less variation in experienced group size inhibits cooperation when the gain sequence is convex and
promotes cooperation when the gain sequence is concave.
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2 Methods
2.1 Group size and experienced group size
We consider an infinitely large and well-mixed population subdivided into groups con-
sisting of a finite number of individuals. We assume that group size is given by a
random variable S with support in the non-negative integers, probability distribution
p = (p0, p1, . . .), and finite expected value Ep[S] =
∑
s ps ·s. We refer to p as the group-
size distribution and assume throughout that p0 + p1 < 1 holds, so that the fraction of
groups with at least two individuals is not zero. 2
Given a group-size distribution p, the fraction pˆs of individuals who find themselves
in a group of size s ≥ 1 is
pˆs =
ps · s
Ep[S]
. (1)
We refer to the probability distribution pˆ = (pˆ1, pˆ2, . . .) defined by (1) as the experienced
group-size distribution and to its associated random variable Sˆ as the experienced group
size. In the statistical literature the experienced group-size distribution is known as
the size-biased sampling distribution (Patil and Rao, 1978).
Unless group size is deterministic, the experienced group-size distribution differs
from the group-size distribution because a randomly sampled individual is more likely
to be a member of a large group than of a small group. Table 1 shows the relationship
between group size and experienced group size for some distributions that are commonly
used to model variation in group size, including the classical models of Poisson and
negative binomial distributions (Okubo, 1986) and the logarithmic distribution featured
in recent theoretical and empirical work on animal group-size distributions (Niwa, 2003;
Ma et al., 2011; Griesser et al., 2011). We will employ the distributions from Table 1
to illustrate our subsequent analysis.
2We refrain from making stronger assumptions on the support of the group-size distribution —such
as imposing a lower and/or upper bound— to accommodate commonly considered models for group-size
distributions that we use for illustrative purposes.
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2.2 Social interactions and gain sequence
Social interactions take place within groups: individuals within each group of size s ≥ 1
participate in a symmetric s-player game. In this game individuals either cooperate
(play action A, contribute to the provision of a collective good) or defect (action B,
do not contribute to the provision of a collective good). The payoff for an individual
is determined by its own action and the number of other individuals in the group who
play action A. Let ak denote the payoff to an A-player and bk denote the payoff to a
B-player when k = 0, 1, . . . , s−1 co-players play A (and hence s−1−k co-players play
B). We alternatively refer to A-players as “cooperators” and B-players as “defectors”.
Let dk = ak − bk denote the k-th gain from switching, i.e., the gain in payoff an
individual makes from cooperating rather than defecting when k co-players cooperate,
and let d = (d0, d1, . . .) denote the corresponding gain sequence. The gain sequence d
is increasing (decreasing, convex, concave) if ∆dk ≥ 0 (∆dk ≤ 0, ∆2dk ≥ 0, ∆2dk ≤ 0)
holds for all k ≥ 0, where ∆dk = dk+1−dk and ∆2dk = ∆dk+1−∆dk. Examples 1 and 2
below, based on Diekmann (1985) and Hauert et al. (2006, Section 2.3.2), illustrate how
these properties of gain sequences arise in two familiar collective action games. Pen˜a
et al. (2014) provide further examples and general discussion of gain sequences, their
properties, and their importance for the evolutionary analysis of multiplayer games.
Example 1 (Volunteer’s dilemma). In the volunteer’s dilemma each cooperator pays
a cost c > 0, whereas defectors incur no cost. If there is at least one cooperator
(“volunteer”) in the group, a public good is produced that provides a benefit u > c to
each member of the group. If there are no cooperators in the group, payoffs are zero for
all individuals in the group. The payoffs in this game are given by ak = (u−c, u−c, u−
c, . . .) and bk = (0, u, u, . . .). The gain sequence is thus dk = (u − c,−c,−c, . . .). Here
∆dk = (−u, 0, 0, . . .) and ∆2dk = (u, 0, 0, . . .), so that the gain sequence is decreasing
and convex.
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Example 2 (Public goods game with synergy or discounting). As in the volunteer’s
dilemma each cooperator incurs a cost c > 0 for a public good to be produced. In
contrast to the volunteer’s dilemma, the benefit each group member obtains from the
public good depends on the number of cooperators in the group and may also differ
between cooperators and defectors. Specifically, if there are j ≥ 1 cooperators in the
group, the value of the public good is u ·∑j−1i=0 vi for defectors and u ·∑j−1i=0 wi for
cooperators, where u > 0, v > 0, and w > 0 are parameters. The gain sequence for
this social interaction is 3
dk = u ·
[
k∑
i=0
wi −
k−1∑
i=0
vi
]
− c, (2)
so that we have
∆dk = u ·
[
wk+1 − vk
]
and
∆2dk = u ·
[
wk+1(w − 1)− vk(v − 1)
]
.
If w = v holds (that is, cooperators and defectors obtain the same benefit), the gain
sequence is increasing and convex for w = v > 1 and is decreasing and convex for
w = v < 1. More generally, the gain sequence is increasing and convex if w ≥ 1 and
w ≥ v holds and is decreasing and convex if 1 ≥ v ≥ w and w(1 − w) ≤ 1 − v holds.
For other parameter values the gain sequence may have different shapes. In particular,
if either v ≥ 1 ≥ w holds or the conditions 1 ≥ w ≥ v and w(1 − w) ≥ 1 − v are both
satisfied, the gain sequence is decreasing and concave. If v ≥ w ≥ 1 and w(w−1) ≤ v−1
holds, the gain sequence is concave and unimodal (that is, increasing up to some critical
value of k and decreasing thereafter).
Before proceeding, we note that the game introduced in Example 2 differs from
3The gain sequence for the volunteer’s dilemma is the limit case of the gain sequence in (2) for
v = w → 0.
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the one introduced in Hauert et al. (2006) —and studied in Pen˜a (2012) for the case
v = w— in that the benefits obtained from the public good are not scaled by the inverse
of the group size. We return to this point in Section 4.
2.3 Gain function and expected gain function
If the proportion of A-players in the population is x, the average payoffs obtained by
an A-player and a B-player who find themselves in a group of size s are respectively
given by
fA(x, s) =
s−1∑
k=0
(
s− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)s−1−kak
and
fB(x, s) =
s−1∑
k=0
(
s− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)s−1−kbk.
The difference between the average payoff of A-players and B-players in groups of size
s is then
f(x, s) = fA(x, s)− fB(x, s) =
s−1∑
k=0
(
s− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)s−1−kdk. (3)
The difference between the average payoff of an A-player and a B-player in the popu-
lation is the expectation of f(x, Sˆ) and thus given by
g(x, pˆ) = Epˆ[f(x, Sˆ)] =
∑
s≥1
pˆsf(x, s), (4)
where we use the subscript pˆ on the expectation operator to emphasize its dependance
on the experienced-group size distribution. Throughout the following we refer to f(x, s)
as the gain function and to g(x, pˆ) as the expected gain function.
Defining
h(x, s) = sf(x, s) (5)
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and using (1) the expected gain can be rewritten in terms of the underlying group-size
distribution as
g(x, pˆ) =
1
Ep[S]
∑
s≥1
psh(x, s), (6)
which is the expression used by Pen˜a (2012, Eq. 3).
2.4 Evolutionary dynamics
We assume that the change in frequency of A-players in the population is described by
the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)
x˙ = x(1− x)g(x, pˆ), (7)
while noting that any other dynamics in which the direction of selection (i.e., the sign
of x˙) is determined by the sign of the expected gain function in the same way as for
the replicator dynamics will lead to identical results.
The replicator dynamics has two rest points at x = 0 (where the whole population
consists of defectors) and at x = 1 (where the whole population consists of cooperators).
Interior rest points are given by the values x∗ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying g(x∗, pˆ) = 0. An interior
rest point x∗ is stable if the expected gain function changes its sign from positive to
negative at x∗, for which dg(x∗, pˆ)/dx < 0 is a sufficient condition. Regarding the
endpoints, x = 1 is stable if the expected gain is positive for sufficiently large x, for
which g(1, pˆ) > 0 is a sufficient condition. Similarly, x = 0 is stable if the expected
gain is negative for sufficiently small x, for which g(0, pˆ) < 0 is a sufficient condition.
Because f(0, s) = d0 holds for all s we have
g(0, pˆ) = d0, for all pˆ (8)
so that the stability of the rest point x = 0 does not depend on the group-size distri-
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bution. To simplify the exposition, we assume d0 6= 0 throughout the following.
When group-size is deterministic and given by s, (7) reduces to
x˙ = x(1− x)f(x, s).
This is the version of the replicator dynamics considered in Pen˜a et al. (2014), who
show how shape properties of the gain sequence d can be used to infer shape properties
of the gain function f and, thus, information about the number and stability of the
rest points of the replicator dynamics for a given deterministic group size.
To illustrate the relationship between the gain sequence, the (expected) gain func-
tion, and the rest points of the replicator dynamics, let us consider the volunteer’s
dilemma from Example 1. Substituting the gain sequence d = (u − c,−c,−c, . . .) into
(3) yields the gain function f(x, s) = u(1 − x)s−1 − c. The gain function is strictly
decreasing in x and satisfies f(0, s) > 0 as well as f(1, s) < 0, so that there is exactly
one interior rest point x∗, which is also the unique stable rest point of the replicator
dynamics when all groups have identical size s. The expected gain function, given by
g(x, pˆ) = u
[∑
s≥1 pˆs(1− x)s−1
]
−c, is also strictly decreasing in x. Further, g(0, pˆ) > 0
holds and, provided that pˆ1 < c/u holds (meaning that an individual is not too likely to
find itself in the position of being the sole member of a group), we also have g(1, pˆ) < 0.
Hence, when the experienced group-size distribution is pˆ, the replicator dynamics will
again have one interior rest point x∗, which is also the unique stable rest point of the
dynamics. While for deterministic group sizes this stable rest point is easily calculated
as x∗ = 1− (c/u)1/(s−1) (Diekmann, 1985), even for a game as simple as the volunteer’s
dilemma no analytical solution for the stable rest point can be determined for general
group-size distributions. Nevertheless, once the right tools are brought to bear on the
issue, a great deal can be said not only about the impact of variability in experienced
group size on the evolutionary dynamics for the volunteer’s dilemma but also for more
complicated games such as the one considered in Example 2.
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2.5 Variability order
As our interest is in isolating the effect of variation in group size on the evolutionary
dynamics, we have to take a stance on how to compare the variability of two distribu-
tions. We follow the standard approach from the literature on stochastic orders (Shaked
and Shanthikumar, 2007) and consider one (experienced) group-size distribution to be
more variable than another if it is more “spread out” in the sense of the so-called con-
vex order. Throughout the following we write q ≥v p if group-size distribution q is
more variable than p in this sense and similarly write qˆ ≥v pˆ if the experienced group-
size distribution qˆ associated with q is more variable than the experienced group-size
distribution pˆ associated with p.
By definition (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007, Chapter 3), q ≥v p means that for
all convex functions φ : R→ R the inequality Eq[φ(Y )] ≥ Ep[φ(X)] holds. As φ(x) = x
and φ(x) = −x are both convex functions, q ≥v p implies Eq[Y ] = Ep[X]. As φ(x) = x2
is a convex function, q ≥v p implies Varq[Y ] ≥ Varp[X]. Consequently, a necessary
condition for a distribution q to be more variable than a distribution p is that q and
p have the same expected value and that the variance of q is at least as high as the
variance of p. Of course (here and in the following discussion of sufficient conditions)
the same statements are applicable for experienced group-size distributions.
The conditions Eq[Y ] = Ep[X] and Varq[Y ] ≥ Varp[X] are not sufficient to imply
that q is more variable in the convex order than p. Rather, provided that the expected
values are the same, a sufficient condition for q ≥v p is that q assigns higher probability
to more extreme realizations of group size in the sense that the sequences (p0, p1, . . .)
and (q0, q1, . . .) cross exactly twice with qs > ps holding for s sufficiently small and
s sufficiently large, whereas ps > qs holds for intermediate values of s (Shaked and
Shanthikumar, 2007, p. 133). This sufficient condition is trivially satisfied when p de-
scribes a deterministic group size: any group-size distribution q with expected value
s is more variable than the deterministic group-size distribution p assigning probabil-
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ity 1 to s. Less trivially, all the (experienced) group-size distributions appearing in
Table 1 are ordered by variability when their expected values coincide: As we show
in Appendix A.1, negative binomial distributions with the same expected value are
ordered by variability according to the value of the parameter η, with the geometric
distribution (corresponding to the case η = 1) being most variable and the Poisson dis-
tribution (corresponding to the limit case η →∞) being least variable. See Fig. 1 for
an illustration. The logarithmic distribution is even more variable than the geometric
distribution. The truncated Poisson, geometric, and Waring distributions considered
in Pen˜a (2012, Fig. 1) provide further examples of distributions satisfying the sufficient
condition stated above. It follows that all the comparisons considered in Pen˜a (2012)
are ones in which the group-size distributions are ordered by variability.
One might think of pursuing the simpler approach of considering one of two distri-
butions with the same expected value to be “more variable” than the other if it has the
higher variance. Alas, such an approach would be of very limited applicability in our
context: unless the expected gain function is determined by the first two moments of
the experienced group-size distribution, knowledge of the expected value and variance
of the experienced group-size distribution (or the actual group-size distribution for that
matter) does not provide enough information to determine the expected gain function.
4 This precludes the possibility of obtaining any general results linking the variance of
the experienced group size to the evolutionary dynamics. Fig. 2 illustrates this for the
volunteer’s dilemma.
4It is not difficult, but tedious, to show that the expected gain function is determined by the first
two moments of the experienced group-size distribution if and only if the gain sequence takes the form
dk = α+βk+γk
2 for some parameters α, β, and γ. In the context of a public goods game with constant
cost c > 0 of contributing to the public good, the gain sequence will take this form if and only if the
benefit of the public good is a polynomial of degree no larger than 3 in the number of contributors. For
the expected gain function to be determined by the first two moments of the group-size distribution
the additional restriction γ = 0 is required.
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2.6 Variability effects and experienced variability effects
A final complication we must face before proceeding to our results is that the distinction
between a more variable group size and a more variable experienced group size is
nontrivial. The reason is that the two conditions Ep[S] = Eq[S] and Epˆ[Sˆ] = Eqˆ[Sˆ] are
not equivalent. Indeed, a simple calculation shows that for any group-size distribution
p we have
Epˆ[Sˆ] = Ep[S] +
Varp(S)
Ep[S]
, (9)
where Varp(S) denotes the variance of the group-size distribution. Hence, whenever
two group-size distributions p and q satisfy q ≥v p and q has a strictly higher variance
than p, the experienced group-size distribution qˆ has a strictly higher expected value
than the experienced group-size distribution pˆ. Consequently, q ≥v p does not imply
qˆ ≥v pˆ, as the two experienced group-size distributions will not have the same expected
value.
Fig. 3 illustrates the importance of this point for the case of the volunteer’s dilemma
and negative-binomially distributed group-sizes. The left panel of the figure shows that
the frequency of cooperators at the stable rest point is a decreasing function of group-
size variability, whereas the right panel shows that the frequency of cooperators at
the stable rest point is an increasing function of experienced group-size variability. As
will become clear later, these strikingly different effects of a change in variability are
entirely driven by the higher average experienced group sizes associated with more
variable group sizes.
We respond by distinguishing between variability and experienced-variability effects
on the frequency of A-players in the population. In particular, we say that there is a
positive experienced-variability effect if qˆ ≥v pˆ implies
g(x, qˆ) ≥ g(x, pˆ) for all x ∈ [0, 1] (10)
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and a negative experienced-variability effect if qˆ ≥v pˆ implies
g(x, qˆ) ≤ g(x, pˆ) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
Hence, in the case of a positive (resp. negative) experienced-variability effect, more
variability in experienced group size unambiguously increases (resp. decreases) the dif-
ference between the average fitness of cooperators and defectors. Similarly, we say that
the variability effect is positive if q ≥v p implies (10) and that it is negative if q ≥v p
implies (11). In either case, the interpretation is that (10) means that variability pro-
motes the evolution of cooperation, whereas (11) means that variability inhibits the
evolution of cooperation.
3 Results
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we establish two preliminary results that
relate shape properties of the gain sequence d to corresponding properties of the gain
function f(x, s). Second, we identify conditions on the gain sequence d which allow us
to sign the experienced-variability effect. Third, we turn to the more challenging task of
signing the variability effect. Fourth, we draw out the implications of the inequalities in
(10) and (11) for the number and location of the rest points of the replicator dynamics
under the conditions which allow us to sign the experienced-variability effect.
3.1 Preliminaries
As noted and discussed in Pen˜a et al. (2014), the gain function f(x, s) is a polynomial
in Bernstein form. The following two preliminary results summarize the properties of
the gain function and the expected gain function that are implied by the theory of
polynomials in Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012) and are of relevance for our analysis.
We begin by relating the monotonicity and convexity properties of the gain sequence
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d to corresponding properties of the gain function f(x, s) when considered as a function
of group size s. Formally, we say that f(x, s) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in s if
∆sf(x, s) = f(x, s+ 1)− f(x, s) ≥ 0 (resp. ∆sf(x, s) ≤ 0) holds for all s ≥ 1 and x ∈
[0, 1]; f(x, s) is convex (resp. concave) in s if ∆2sf(x, s) = ∆sf(x, s+ 1)−∆sf(x, s) ≥ 0
(resp. ∆2sf(x, s) ≤ 0) holds for all s ≥ 1 and x ∈ [0, 1]. With this terminology in place,
we can state the following lemma. The proof, which uses an observation due to Motro
(1991), is in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1. If the gain sequence d is increasing (decreasing, convex, concave), then the
gain function f(x, s) is increasing (decreasing, convex, concave) in group size s.
As noted in Pen˜a et al. (2014, Remark 3), the gain function f(x, s) inherits the
monotonicity and convexity properties of the gain sequence d when considered as a
function of x. In particular, when the gain sequence d is increasing (decreasing), then
the gain function f(x, s) is increasing (decreasing) in x. Similarly, when the gain se-
quence d is convex (concave), then f(x, s) is convex (concave) in x. As monotonicity
and convexity properties are preserved by taking weighted averages, it is immediate
from (4) that the expected gain function g(x, pˆ) inherits these monotonicity and con-
vexity properties in x no matter what the experienced group-size distribution pˆ is. The
following result thus requires no further proof.
Lemma 2. If the gain sequence d is increasing (decreasing, convex, concave), then
the expected gain function g(x, pˆ) is increasing (decreasing, convex, concave) in the
proportion x of A-players for all experienced group-size distributions pˆ.
3.2 Signing the experienced-variability effect
Suppose that the gain sequence d is convex. Then, as established in Lemma 1, the
function f(x, s) is convex in group size s no matter what the fraction x of A-players in
the population is. By the very definition of the relationship qˆ ≥v pˆ, convexity of f(x, s)
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in group-size s is in turn sufficient to imply the inequality Eqˆ[f(x, Sˆ)] ≥ Epˆ[f(x, Sˆ)]
or, recalling the definition of the expected gain function in (4), the inequality in (10).
It thus follows that the experienced-variability effect is positive whenever the gain
sequence d is convex. An analogous argument shows that concavity of d is sufficient to
imply inequality (11). Consequently, we obtain the following simple sufficient conditions
on the payoff structure of the game under which the experienced-variability effect can
be signed. The formal proof is in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1.
[1.1] If the gain sequence d is convex, then the experienced-variability effect is pos-
itive.
[1.2] If the gain sequence d is concave, then the experienced-variability effect is
negative.
As we have noted before, the gain sequence for the volunteer’s dilemma in Example 1
is convex. Hence, it is an immediate implication of Proposition 1.1 that the experienced-
variability effect is positive for the volunteer’s dilemma. The results for the public
goods game with synergy or discounting in Example 2 are more nuanced: here the gain
sequence is convex for some parameter values (including the case v = w considered in
Pen˜a (2012)) and concave for others. From Proposition 1 an increase in experienced
variability promotes cooperation in the former case but inhibits it in the latter.
3.3 Signing the variability effect
Heuristically, we may think of an increase in variability in group-size as giving rise
to two effects, namely (i) an increase in the variability of the experienced group-size
distribution and (ii) an upward shift in that distribution. As we have discussed in
Section 2.6, the source of the second effect is that an increase in the variability of
the group-size distribution increases the expected value of the experienced group size:
q ≥v p implies Eqˆ[S] ≥ Epˆ[S].
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Provided that the gain sequence is convex or concave, the first of these effects —the
experienced variability effect— can be signed (Proposition 1). It is intuitive that the
sign of the second effect, namely the size effect resulting from an increase in the ex-
pected experienced group size, is determined by the monotonicity properties of the gain
sequence: for a given proportion x of A-players in the population a higher experienced
group size increases the average number of A-players in a group a focal player will expe-
rience, which in turn increases (resp. decreases) the difference in average payoff between
A-players and B-players when the gain sequence is increasing (resp. decreasing). This
suggests that the variability effect can be signed if the gain sequence is either increasing
and convex or decreasing and concave because in these cases the experienced-variability
effect and the size effect both point in the same direction.
The proof of the following proposition in Appendix A.2 confirms this intuition.
In this proof the function h(x, s) = sf(x, s), that we have introduced in (5), plays a
central role. Writing the expected gain function as in (6) it is immediate from the
definition of the convex order that convexity (resp. concavity) of the function h(x, s)
is sufficient to imply a positive (resp. negative) variability effect. This first step of the
proof generalizes the observation from Pen˜a (2012) that convexity of h(x, s) implies that
group-size variability promotes cooperation relative to the benchmark of a deterministic
group size. We complete the proof by showing that the function h(x, s) is convex
(resp. concave) in group size s for all x when the gain sequence is increasing and
convex (resp. decreasing and concave).
Proposition 2.
[2.1] If the gain sequence d is increasing and convex, then the variability effect is
positive.
[2.2] If the gain sequence d is decreasing and concave, then the variability effect is
negative.
While there are collective action problems for which the gain sequence satisfies the
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conditions appearing in Proposition 2 —for instance, Example 2 provides conditions on
the parameter values of the public goods game with synergy or discounting for which
this is the case— these conditions are much more stringent that the ones in Proposition
1. In the cases not covered by Proposition 2, e.g., when the gain sequence is decreasing
and convex (as in the volunteer’s dilemma from Example 1) or is concave and unimodal
(as it is the case in the model of Bach et al. (2006) or for a broad range of parameter
values in the game considered in Example 2), no clear-cut prediction for the variability
effect is possible. The reason is that in such games the experienced-variability effect
and the size effect may not only point in opposite directions but their relative strength
depends on the frequency x of cooperators in the population and, further, on the
particular group-size distributions under consideration. As a consequence, even in the
simplest case in which the replicator dynamics has a unique stable rest point, no general
conclusions about the effect of an increase in group-size variability on the the location
of this rest point are possible. For instance, while Fig. 3 documents a case in which the
stable rest point in the volunteer’s dilemma is decreasing in group-size variability, it is
apparent from Pen˜a (2012, Fig. 5) that for other parameter values increasing group-
size variability can either increase or decrease the stable frequency of cooperators in
the volunteer’s dilemma.
3.4 Experienced variability and the rest points of the replicator dy-
namics
The upshot of the preceding discussion in Section 3.3 is that beyond the circumstances
delineated in Proposition 2 there is little hope of gaining robust insights into the effect
of a change in group-size variability on the evolution of cooperation. In this section
we thus focus on the impact of an increase in experienced variability for the number
and location of the (stable) rest points of the replicator dynamics. We do so for games
with gain sequences d that are either convex or concave, so that the experienced-
19
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/021485doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jun. 25, 2015; 
variability effect can be signed by Proposition 1. Several case distinctions arise because
convex or concave gain sequences are general enough to allow for qualitatively different
dynamic regimes with zero, one, or two interior rest points. Thus, two kinds of effects
may arise due to an increase or decrease in experienced variability, which we explore
by considering the differences between the evolutionary dynamics for two experienced
group-size distributions satisfying qˆ ≥v pˆ. First, the number of stable rest points may
stay unchanged while the location of these rests points changes. Second, the number
of stable rest points might change, either via (i) a transcritical bifurcation by which
an interior point collides with or emerges from the fixed point at x = 1, or (ii) a
saddle-node bifurcation by which two interior fixed points (one stable, one unstable)
are created or destroyed.
3.4.1 Convex gain sequences
From Proposition 1.1 we know that condition (10) holds for convex gain sequences,
so that the gain function for the more variable experienced group-size distribution qˆ
lies above the gain function for the experienced group-size distribution pˆ. Further, by
Lemma 2 the gain functions g(x, pˆ) and g(x, qˆ) are both convex in the proportion x
of cooperators. As a nontrivial convex function can have at most two zeros, it follows
that the replicator dynamics for the two experienced group-size distributions under
consideration has at most two interior rest points. Further, if the gain sequence is not
only convex, but also monotonic (that is, either increasing or decreasing), so will be
the expected gain function (Lemma 2), implying that in these cases there is at most
one interior rest point.
If the replicator dynamics for pˆ and qˆ have the same number of interior rest points,
then an increase in experienced variability has no effect on the stability of the rest
points. For instance, if d0 < 0 holds and for both experienced group-size distributions
there is a unique interior rest point, then (8) and the fact that stable and unstable
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rest points must alternate imply that for both pˆ and qˆ the rest point x = 0 is stable,
the interior rest point is unstable, and the rest point at x = 1 is stable. Further, (10)
implies that an increase in experienced variability causes the proportion of cooperators
in an unstable interior rest to decrease, whereas the proportion of cooperators in a
stable interior rest point increases. The left panel of Fig. 4 illustrates these assertions
for the case of an increasing and convex gain sequence arising from the collective action
problem in Example 2.
Depending on the sign of d0, a more variable experienced group-size distribution
may either increase or decrease the number of interior rest points of the replicator
dynamics for a convex gain sequence. Suppose d0 < 0 holds. We can then distinguish
two cases. In the first case g(1, pˆ) > 0 holds and the replicator dynamics for pˆ has a
unique interior rest point (which is unstable). Hence (10) implies that the replicator
dynamics for qˆ also has a unique interior rest point, so that the number of interior rest
points is unchanged and the analysis from the preceding paragraph is applicable. In
the second case g(1, pˆ) < 0 holds and there is no interior rest point. If the experienced-
variability effect is sufficiently strong as to induce g(1, qˆ) > 0, then the replicator
dynamics for qˆ has one interior rest point and the rest point at x = 1 is stable, whereas
the replicator dynamics for pˆ has no interior rest point and x = 1 is unstable. In this
scenario, illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 4, the positive experienced-variability
effect thus manifests itself in stabilizing a fully cooperative population via a transcritical
bifurcation. In contrast, if d0 > 0 holds, then the replicator dynamics for qˆ cannot have
more, but might have less, rest points than the replicator dynamics for pˆ. For instance,
when the gain sequence d is convex and decreasing (as in the volunteer’s dilemma)
and the inequality g(1, pˆ) < 0 < g(1, qˆ) holds, then d0 > 0 implies that the replicator
dynamics for pˆ has one interior rest point, which is also the unique stable rest point,
whereas the replicator dynamics for qˆ has no interior rest point and x = 1 is the unique
stable rest point.
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3.4.2 Concave gain sequences
For a concave gain sequence d the experienced-variability effect is negative (Proposition
1.2), that is, qˆ ≥v pˆ implies (11). Further, Lemma 2 shows that both g(x, pˆ) and g(x, qˆ)
are concave in x and thus have at most two interior rest points.
As in the case of convex gain sequences, two scenarios are possible. First, the
replicator dynamics for pˆ and qˆ may have the same number of rest points in which
case (8) implies that the stability pattern of the rest points for the two dynamics is
identical and, further, (11) implies that the fraction of cooperators in an interior stable
rest point is higher for the experienced group-size distribution qˆ, whereas the fraction
of cooperators in an interior unstable rest point is higher for the experienced group-size
distribution pˆ. The left panel of Fig. 5 illustrates this scenario for an unimodal and
concave gain function arising from the gain sequence of the collective action problem
introduced in Example 2.
Second, the replicator dynamics for the more variable qˆ may have less (when d0 < 0)
or more (when d0 > 0) interior rest points than the replicator dynamics for pˆ. For
instance, when d0 < 0 and g(1, pˆ) < 0 holds, then the replicator dynamics for pˆ may
have two interior rest points (with the first of these being unstable and the second
stable), whereas with a sufficiently strong experienced-variability effect a saddle-node
bifurcation occurs and the replicator dynamics for qˆ has no interior rest point. This
possibility is illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 5. We note that the situation
illustrated in this figure is analogous to the one considered in Bach et al. (2006), who
also show that a downward shift in a unimodal concave gain function may cause the
number of interior rest points of the replicator dynamics to drop from two to zero via
a saddle-node bifurcation. The key difference between the scenario considered in Bach
et al. (2006) and the one we consider here is that in their model the disappearance of
the interior rest points is caused by a downward shift in the gain sequence d, whereas
in our model the gain sequence is given and it is a shift in the experienced group-size
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distribution which induces the bifurcation causing the disappearance of the interior rest
points.
4 Discussion
We have studied the effect of variation in group size on the evolution of cooperative
behavior. Provided that variation in group size is measured according to its induced
effect on the variability of the experienced group-size distribution, the model offers
clear predictions: more experienced variability promotes cooperation when the payoff
structure of the collective action problem implies a convex gain sequence and inhibits
cooperation when the gain sequence is concave. We further showed that these vari-
ability effects can have important dynamic consequences. These include the shifting,
creation, and destruction of internal equilibria and the stabilization of the full coop-
erative equilibrium (cf. Fig. 4 and 5). Altogether, our results add to previous work
demonstrating the importance of accounting for group-size distributions in models of
the evolution of social behaviors (Bra¨nnstro¨m et al., 2011; Pen˜a, 2012).
Our analysis raises the question of which collective action problems besides the
ones we have considered in Examples 1 and 2 give rise to convex or concave gain
sequences. This is so for the class of club good games with accelerating or decelerating
production functions considered in Pen˜a et al. (2015). In these games defectors are
excluded from the consumption of the collective good and obtain a payoff of zero.
The payoff to a cooperator is uk+1 − c, where the benefit uj from obtaining the club
good is increasing in the number of cooperators j and c > 0 is the cost of providing
the good. Here the gain sequence is simply dk = uk+1 − c, which is convex when uj is
convex (accelerating production function) and concave when uj is concave (decelerating
production function). For many commonly studied collective action problems, however,
the gain sequences are neither convex nor concave. Examples are (i) public goods games
involving nontrivial thresholds, such that the cooperation of more than one but less than
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the total number of players is required to produce a collective good (Bach et al., 2006;
Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011), (ii) games of multiplayer reciprocity
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988), and (iii) variants of the volunteer’s dilemma where the
cost of providing the good is shared among cooperators (Weesie and Franzen, 1998),
sometimes referred to as multiplayer snowdrift game (Zheng et al., 2007; Souza et al.,
2009). No unambiguous, general conclusions concerning the effect of variable group
sizes can be obtained in these cases. Instead, the gain function has to be explicitly
calculated under different group size (or experienced group size) distributions in order
to correctly sign the experienced-variability and the variability effects.
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that payoffs for individuals are deter-
mined by their own action (whether to cooperate or defect) and the number of coop-
erators in the group. All of our analysis carries over without substantial changes to
the case in which the payoff consequences of own actions depend on the number of
defectors (rather than the number of cooperators) in the group. Consider, for instance,
the weakest-link stag hunt game (Hirshleifer, 1983). This game is like the volunteer’s
dilemma, except that the cooperation of all individuals in a group is required for the
benefit to be produced. To analyse this game we may consider the gains from switching
as a function of the number of other individuals in the group that play defect (rather
than cooperate). The resulting gain sequence is identical to the one for the volun-
teer’s dilemma. Consequently, Proposition 1.1 continues to apply and we may conclude
that an increase (resp. decrease) in experienced variability promotes (resp. inhibits)
cooperative behavior in the weakest-link stag hunt game.
As we have already noted at the end of Section 2.2, Hauert et al. (2006) assume that
the benefits in their public goods game with synergy or discounting are scaled by the
inverse of group-size. This implies that the gains from switching are no longer solely
determined by the number of cooperators in the group but depend directly on group
size. Consequently, our analysis is not directly applicable. It can be shown, however,
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that with such scaled benefits the very same conditions which ensure the convexity
(resp. concavity) of the gain function f(x, s) in group size in our version of the public
goods game (see Example 2) now ensure that the function h(x, s) = sf(x, s) is convex
(resp. concave) in group-size. As convexity (resp. concavity) of h(x, s) in group size
is sufficient to sign the variability effect (cf. the discussion preceding the statement
of Proposition 2), we obtain the following, somewhat surprising result: with scaled
benefits the variability effect can be signed under exactly the same conditions that
allowed us to sign the experienced-variability effect. In particular, the results shown
in Pen˜a (2012, Fig. 2) for the scaled version of the public goods game with synergy or
discounting are not limited to the particular group-size distributions considered there,
but hold for arbitrary group-size distributions that are ordered by variability.
This paper has followed Pen˜a (2012) in investigating the evolutionary consequences
of variation in group size using the replicator dynamics of two-strategy multiplayer
games. While this is a common approach is the literature on collective action prob-
lems (Motro, 1991; Bach et al., 2006; Pen˜a et al., 2014), alternative approaches are
possible. In particular, the very same question we are interested in has been explored
by Bra¨nnstro¨m et al. (2011) in the framework of continuous strategies and adaptive
dynamics (Metz et al., 1996). In contrast to us, Bra¨nnstro¨m et al. (2011) focus on a
class of games in which the selection gradient (the counterpart to our gain function)
is determined by the average contribution in the group, so that variability in group
size has no effect on the location of the singular rest points (corresponding to the rest
points of our dynamics). Rather, the effect of variation in group size in their setting
reflects itself in whether evolutionary branching can occur near a singular strategy and
this is the question they study. Despite such fundamental differences, the analysis in
Bra¨nnstro¨m et al. (2011) shares a common feature with ours, namely that the variance
of the group-size distribution is not a suitable measure of variability. The measure of
variability used by Bra¨nnstro¨m et al. (2011), the average inverse group size, is consistent
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with our approach in the sense that more variable group-size distributions according
to our definition have higher average inverse group size.
We conclude by noting that we have taken the group-size distribution to be ex-
ogenous and assumed that the experienced group-size distribution is independent of
the behavior of the individuals under consideration. It would be a logical next step to
extend out analysis to models in which these assumptions are relaxed. For instance, in
addition to their different cooperative tendencies, individuals might vary with respect
to the size of the group they would prefer to join (Powers et al., 2011) or their intrinsic
ability to form groups (Garcia and De Monte, 2013). In these cases, group sizes are
expected to vary endogenously in nontrivial ways. If the underlying collective action
problem involves nonlinearities, the variability effects described in this paper will also
arise and feed back into the evolutionary dynamics. Future work should investigate how
variation in group size might affect the coevolution of group formation and cooperation
in collective action dilemmas.
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Appendix
A.1 Ordering of some common (experienced) group-size distributions
by their variability
Suppose the distribution p of X is negative binomial with parameters ηx and pix, and
the distribution q of Y is negative binomial with parameters ηy and piy. Assume further
that pixηx/(1−pix) = piyηy/(1−piy) holds, so that both random variables have the same
expected value (cf. Table 1). Whitt (1985) demonstrates that the relationship q ≥v p
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is then implied if the inequality
rq(s) ≥ rp(s) (12)
holds for all s ≥ 1, where rp(s) and rq(s) denote the indices of relative log-concavity of
the two distributions, which can be calculated as (see Whitt, 1985, Example 6)
rp(s) =
(s+ 1)(ηx + s− 1)
s(ηx + s)
,
rq(s) =
(s+ 1)(ηy + s− 1)
s(ηy + s)
.
A straightforward calculation shows that condition (12) is satisfied for all s ≥ 1 when
ηx ≥ ηy holds. Consequently, we have q ≥v p if ηx ≥ ηy is satisfied. Further, as the
Poisson distribution can be obtained as the limit of the negative binomial distribution
for η →∞ and the geometric distribution corresponds to the negative binomial with η =
1, it follows that (provided the expected values are identical) a geometric distribution
is more variable than any negative binomial distribution with η > 1 and every negative
binomial distribution is more variable than a Poisson distribution. In particular, any
two of the experienced group-size distributions appearing in Table 1 are ordered by
variability when they have the same expected value.
These kinds of comparisons can be extended to many other familiar distributions.
For instance, the Waring distribution considered in Pen˜a (2012) as a group-size distri-
bution is a mixture of geometric distributions (Johnson et al., 2005, p. 290) and is thus
(Whitt, 1985, Example 6) more variable than the geometric distribution with the same
expected value as the Waring distribution under consideration. Similarly, it is imme-
diate from Johnson et al. (2005, Eq. 7.21, p. 307) that the logarithmic distribution
featured in Table 1 is more variable than the geometric distribution.
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A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The polynomial in Bernstein form of degree n of the sequence
d = (d0, d1, d2, . . .) is
Bn (x; d) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kdk, (13)
so that from (3) we have
f(x, s) = Bs−1 (x; d) . (14)
By (14) we have
∆sf(x, s) = Bs(x, d)− Bs−1(x, d) (15)
and
∆2sf(x, s) = [Bs+1(x, d)− Bs(x, d)]− [Bs(x, d)− Bs−1(x, d)] . (16)
Motro (1991) shows (cf. the proof of part (ii) of the proposition in his appendix)
that
Bs(x, d)− Bs−1(x, d) = xBs−1(x,∆d) (17)
holds for x ∈ [0, 1], s ≥ 1 and all sequences d. Observing that the polynomial in
Bernstein form appearing on the right side of (17) is positive (negative) when all its
coefficients are positive (negative) it follows from (15) that for increasing (decreasing) d
we have that ∆sf(x, s) is positive (negative) for all x ∈ [0, 1] and s ≥ 1. This establishes
that f(x, s) is increasing (decreasing) in s when d is increasing (decreasing).
Applying (17) to both terms in square brackets in (16) and simplifying we obtain
∆2sf(x, s) = x [Bs(x,∆d)− Bs−1(x,∆d)] .
As (17) holds for all sequences d, we can apply it with ∆d in place of d, to obtain
Bs(x,∆d)− Bs−1(x,∆d) = xBs−1(x,∆2d).
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Combining the previous two equalities yields
∆2sf(x, s) = x
2Bs−1(x; ∆2d). (18)
As the right side of (18) is positive (negative) if d is convex (concave), this establishes
that f(x, s) is convex (concave) in s if d is convex (concave).
Proof of Proposition 1: Let gˆ ≥v pˆ and let d be convex. From Lemma 1, convexity
of d implies that f(x, s) is convex in s. Because qˆ ≥v pˆ implies that the inequality
Eqˆ[φ(Sˆ)] ≥ Epˆ[φ(Sˆ)] holds for all convex functions φ, it follows that Eqˆ[f(x, Sˆ)] ≥
Epˆ[f(x, Sˆ)] holds for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting the definition of the gain function (4)
into this inequality, we obtain (10). Consequently, the experienced variability effect is
positive when d is convex.
When d is concave, Lemma 1 implies that f(x, s) is concave in s, so that −f(x, s) is
convex in s. Hence qˆ ≥v pˆ yields that the inequality −Eqˆ[f(x, Sˆ)] ≥ −Epˆ[f(x, Sˆ)] holds
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Multiplying both sides of the inequality by −1 and using the definition
of the gain function (4), we obtain (11). Consequently, the experienced variability effect
is negative when d is concave.
Proof of Proposition 2: We show that for increasing and convex d, q ≥v p implies
(10), thus establishing the first part of the proposition. (As in the proof of Proposition
1, the result for the case in which d is decreasing and concave follows by an analogous
argument.)
Using (6), we may write
g(x, pˆ) =
1
Ep[S]
∑
s
psh(x, s),
g(x, qˆ) =
1
Eq[S]
∑
s
qsh(x, s).
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As q ≥v p implies Ep[S] = Eq[S], it follows that the variability effect is positive if
∑
s
qsh(x, s) ≥
∑
s
psh(x, s) (19)
holds for all x. By definition of the convex order, (19) is satisfied whenever h(x, s) is
convex in s, so that it suffices to establish this property.
If d is increasing and convex, then f(x, s) is increasing and convex in group-size s
(Lemma 1). Using the definition h(x, s) = sf(x, s), a straightforward calculation shows
that
∆sh(x, s) = (s+ 1)∆sf(x, s) + f(x, s), (20)
∆2sh(x, s) = (s+ 2)∆
2
sf(x, s) + 2∆sf(x, s). (21)
Because f(x, s) is increasing and convex in group size, it satisfies ∆sf(x, s) ≥ 0 and
∆2sf(x, s) ≥ 0, so that (21) implies ∆2sh(x, s) ≥ 0. Hence, h(x, s) is convex.
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Figure 1: Three group-size distributions ordered by variability. p1 is the geometric
distribution NB(1, 5/6), p2 the negative-binomial distribution NB(5, 1/2), and p3 is the
Poisson distribution Po(5). All three distributions have an expected value of 5 and are
thus, as shown in Appendix A.1, ordered by variability with the geometric distribution
p1 being most variable and the Poisson distribution p3 being least variable. As explained
in the text this can be seen graphically by observing that each pair of probability mass
functions crosses exactly twice, with the geometric distribution assigning most weight
and the Poisson distribution assigning least weight to extreme realizations.
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Figure 2: Different experienced group-size distributions with the same mean and vari-
ance can lead to different evolutionary dynamics. Here we illustrate the evolutionary
dynamics as given by (7) for the volunteer’s dilemma with c = 1, u = 6 (cf. Example
1) and two experienced group-size distributions. The first distribution, pˆ (blue), has
support {2, 4, 6} with (pˆ2, pˆ4, pˆ6) = (0.3, 0.4, 0.3); the second distribution, qˆ (red), has
support {3, 4, 7} with (qˆ3, qˆ4, qˆ7) = (0.6, 0.2, 0.2). With these values, Epˆ(Sˆ) = Eqˆ(Sˆ) = 4
and Varpˆ(Sˆ) = Varqˆ(Sˆ) = 2.4. The replicator dynamics for these two cases are however
different, with the distribution pˆ leading to the stable rest point x∗pˆ ≈ 0.57 (blue circle),
and the distribution pˆ leading to the stable rest point x∗qˆ ≈ 0.51 (red circle).
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Figure 3: Stable frequency of cooperators x∗ as a function of group-size variability (left)
and experienced group-size variability (right) in the volunteer’s dilemma (c = 2.5, u =
12). In both panels variability increases when going from left to right with the inverse
of the parameter η of a negative-binomial group-size distribution on the horizontal
axis (cf. Table 1). Left: group size is distributed according to the negative binomial
NB(η, pi) with parameter pi adjusted such that the expected group size is 5 for all η.
The stable fraction of cooperators is a decreasing function of group-size variability as
measured by 1/η. Right: group size is distributed according to the negative binomial
NB(η, pi) with parameter pi adjusted such that the expected experienced group size is
5 for all η. The stable fraction of cooperators is an increasing function of experienced
group-size variability as measured by 1/η.
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Figure 4: Positive experienced-variability effect for a game with increasing and convex
gain sequence. The game is the public goods game with synergy or discounting of
Example 2 with u = 1, v = 1.2, w = 1.3. The group-size distributions p and q
are respectively given by a Poisson distribution Po(λ) with λ = 4 and a negative
binomial distribution NB(η, pi) with η = 1 and pi = 2/3. With these parameters,
Epˆ[Sˆ] = Eqˆ[Sˆ] = 5 (cf. Table 1). Moreover, qˆ is more variable than pˆ (cf. Appendix
A.1). Left. c = 4. Increasing experienced variability from pˆ to qˆ causes the unstable
interior rest point (open circle) to decrease, hence increasing the basin of attraction of
the fully cooperative, stable rest point x = 1. Right. c = 6. Increasing experienced
variability from pˆ to qˆ stabilizes the otherwise unstable fully cooperative rest point
x = 1 via a transcritical bifurcation.
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Figure 5: Negative experienced-variability effect for a game with unimodal and concave
gain sequence. The game is the public goods game with synergy or discounting of
Example 2 with u = 1, v = 1.3, w = 1.2, c = 1.175. The group-size distribution
p is given by a Poisson distribution Po(λ) with λ = 4. The group-size distributions
q1 and q2 are respectively given by negative binomial distributions NB(η1, pi1) and
NB(η2, pi2) with η1 = 9, η2 = 1, pi1 = 2/7, pi2 = 2/3. With these parameters, Epˆ[Sˆ] =
Eqˆ1 [Sˆ] = Eqˆ2 [Sˆ] = 5 for the associated experienced group-size distributions (cf. Table
1). Moreover, qˆ2 is more variable than qˆ1 and qˆ1 is more variable than pˆ (cf. Appendix
A.1). Left. Increasing experienced variability from pˆ to qˆ1 causes the unstable interior
rest point (open circle) to increase and the stable interior rest point (filled circle) to
decrease. The fraction of cooperators at the interior stable rest point thus decreases
and its basin of attraction shrinks. Right. Increasing experienced variability from pˆ
to qˆ2 makes the gain function strictly negative. Consequently, the interior rest point
disappears (through a saddle-node bifurcation) and the fully defective rest point x = 0
remains as the only stable rest point.
39
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/021485doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jun. 25, 2015; 
S ps Sˆ pˆs for s ≥ 1
Po(λ) λ
s
s! exp(−λ) 1 + Po(λ) λ
s−1
(s−1)! exp(−λ)
NB(η, pi)
(
η+s−1
s
)
pis(1− pi)η 1 + NB(η + 1, pi) (η+s−1s−1 )pis−1(1− pi)η+1
L(δ) −1ln(1−δ)
δs
s 1 + NB(1, δ) δ
s−1(1− δ)
Table 1: Experienced group-size distributions (Sˆ) for some common group-size distri-
butions (S). Po(λ) refers to a Poisson distribution with parameter λ > 0, which has
support on the nonnegative integers and expected value λ. NB(η, pi) refers to a nega-
tive binomial distribution with parameters η > 0 and 0 < pi < 1, which has support on
the nonnegative integers and expected value ηpi/(1 − pi). L(δ) refers to a logarithmic
distribution with parameter 0 < δ < 1, which has support on the natural numbers and
expected value δ/ [(δ − 1) ln(1− δ)]. Note that NB(1, pi) corresponds to a geometric
distribution. See Table 1 in Patil and Rao (1978) for these and further examples.
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